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IN THE SUPREME COUR 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PIONEER SA 'r-INGS 11ND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corpora-
tion, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 
PI 0 NEE R }"'lNAI~CE ..t\ N D 10227 
'l,HRI}__,T COMP .L-\NY and PIO-
rate. 
NEER FINANCE .1\.ND 'l,HRIF'l., 
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE 
CITY, UTAH, 
DefendanJs an.d Appella·nts. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appellants' state1nent of the kind of case is accu-
In the lower court the Judge entered a decree 
permane11tly enjoining the defendants from using the 
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name Pioneer Finance and Thrift Company or any 
similar name which 1nay be confused with the name 
Pioneer Savings and Loan Association in carrying on 
an industrial loan business within the limits of the 
Sugarhouse trade area. The Decree was entered on the 
plaintiff's (respondent's) n1otjon for summary judg-
ment based upon the pleadings in the case and on. the 
discovery proceedings of record (R 21) and further 
based upon the agreement of the parties at the pre-
trial and there were no disputed items of fact left which 
could become the subject of an adversary proceeding 
and that only matters of law re1nained to be deter-
mined (R 36). 
RELIEF SOUGH'!, ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks to reverse the Judgment of 
the lower court. The plaintiff asks only that the J udg-
Inent of the lower court be affirmed. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff corporation was organzied and in-
corporated on the 4th day of March, 1954 and shortly 
thereafter was authorized by the Banking Department 
of the State of Utah to carry on and conduct a business 
as a savings and loan association. It commenced the 
operation of. its business as a savings and loan associa-
tion at 1045 East 21st South, Salt Lake City~ Utah 
2 
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under the nan1e and style of Pioneer Savings and Lo, 
Association on the 28th day of April, 1955 and eve~ 
since said date has continued to carry on such businessl 
at that address. The said address, 1045 East 21st South 
Street, is within the corporate lirnits of Salt Lake City 
and is also within a particular economic trade and busi-
ness area of Salt Lake City known as "Sugarhouse." 
Defendant, Pio11eer }'inance and Thrift Company, 
'vas incorporated on October 21, 1953 under the name 
of Pioneer Industrial I_Joan Company, its name being 
changed to Pioneer Finance and Thrift Company on 
June 15, 1955. Pioneer Finance and Thrift Company 
is also a successor company to Pioneer Finance Cor-
poration, which was incorporated on June 29, 1948 
and operated in Richfield, Utah and vicinity. Pioneer 
Finance Corporation was consolidated with Pioneer 
Finance and Thrift Company by agreement of merger 
on November 17, 1956. 
Pioneer Finance and 'fhrift Company of Salt Lake 
City was incorporated May 14, 19!18. However, busi-
ness was conducted in Salt Lake City and a loan license 
was issued July 1, 1955 under the name of Pioneer 
Finance and 'l.,hrift Company. Business is and has been 
conducted in Salt Lake County, State of Utah by the 
defendants under the names and during the tirnes and 
at the addresses as follows: 
a. Pioneer Finance and 'fhrift Company, 434 I~ast 
4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Business commenced 
July 1, 1955. 'l.,he same business was continued at the 
3 
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same address under the na1ne of Pioneer Finance and 
'fhrift Company of Salt Lake from May 14, 1958. 
b. Pioneer Finance Corporation, 29 East Center, 
Midvale, Utah co1nmenced business on August 9, 1951. 
Business was conducted at 53 East Center, Midvale, 
Utah under the name of Pioneer Industrial Loan Coin-
pany, and is now conducted under the na1ne of Pioneer 
Finance and Thrift Company of Midvale. 'fhis is the 
only ·place in Salt Lake County where defendants' 
operation pre-dated plaintiff's operation. 
c. Pioneer Finance and 'l,hrift Company, Deseret 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah from November 17, 
1956. 
d. Pioneer Construction Company, Deseret Build-
ing, Salt Lake City, Utah, August 3, 1959. (R 9, 10 
and 11}. 
During the year 1964 the defendants commenced 
the construction of a building at 1025 East 21st South 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, said address being on 
the same side of the street as the principal place of 
business of plaintiff at 1045 East 21st South Street 
and less than 100 feet physically removed fro1n said 
place of business of the plaintiff. Defendant conten1-
plated operation of an industrial loan company at said 
address under the style of Pioneer Finance and 1'hrift 
Company. 
Both the plaintiff and the defendants had served 
interrogatories and each had answered under oath the 
4 
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interrogatories required to be answered, which ans\\. 
were a part of the files at the time the motion for sun_ . 
mary jt1dgment was considered. Both the plaintiff and' 
the defendants filed motions for summary judgment, 
each stating that their motions "will be based upon the 
pleadings and the discovery proceedings now of record'' 
(R 21, 22). 
The respective n1otions for summary judgment 
were heard by the Court, the Honorable Marcellus K. 
Snu\v sitting, at ·which time each counsel moved for 
their respective summary judgments, "agreeing and 
admitting that there were no disputed items of fact 
left which could become the subject of an adversary 
proceeding, and that the only matter left was the mat-
ter of law to be presented by each counsel ... " ( R 36) . 
The lower court entered an order granting plaintiff's 
motion for Summary Judgment and denying defend-
ants' motion. 'I11ereafter, the lower court entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree 
permanently enjoining the defendants from using the 
name Pioneer }..,inance and 'I'hrift Company or any 
similar name which may be confused with the name 
Pioneer Savings and Loan Association in carrying on 
and conducting an industrial loan business within the 
limits of the Sugarhouse trade area. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE },INDINGS OF, F,AC'l, ENTERED BY 
'rHE DIS'l,RIC'f COUR'l" WERE AMPLY SUP-
PORTED BY THE E';IDENCE, ANS\VERS 
TO INTERROGA'fORIES, PLEADINGS AND 
ADMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES. 
·Defendants complain that some of the Findings 
of Fact were based upon answers to interrogatories 
already on file and state that "had the plaintiff sup-
ported its motion for Summary Judgment .. by notice 
that it intended to use the answers made by it to inter-
rogatories already on file as an Affidavit in support 
of its motion, the defendants would have filed opposing 
Affidavits ... " Surely the plaintiff could have given 
no clearer notice that it intended to use said answers 
than it gave in its notice of the motion when it stated 
that it would be ''based upon the pleadings in the case, 
and on the discovery · proceedings now of record" 
(R 21). 
It appears that the defendants were willing that 
the matter be deter1nined on the basis of the information 
contained in the answers for each party to the inter-
raga tories and of the facts set forth in the pleadings, 
when it agreed with the Court that there 'vere no 
material disputed items of fact. But, when the Court, 
in considering all the facts and the law, determined 
that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, the de-
fendants now wish to back up from their previous 
6 
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admissions and position and say that such agree~ 
'vas intended to apply only if the court should ruh 
in their favor. Such purely should not be countenance~ 
'fhis is particularly true when we examine the Inat-
ters concerning which the defendant makes the most 
objection. Defendant objects that there was not intro~ 
duced in evidence, except through the pleadings and 
through the answers to interrogatories, information as 
to the date of incorporation of the plaintiff company. 
Surely, this is a matter of public record and we believe 
the defendants oug·ht not in good faith be heard to 
complain about a finding as to a matter so easily ascer-
tainable, and one which, had request for admission been 
made, would surely have had to be admitted. 
Futhermore, as to the question of the trade area 
of operation of the plaintiff corporation, through its 
priority of establishment in that area, the defendants 
complain that the only evidence as to what contemplates 
the Sugarhouse area is that contained in the answers 
to the interrogat~ries. 
It would appear that the Court sitting in the Third 
District in Salt Lake County could take judicial notice 
of what generally composes the area known as "Sugar-
house." Surely the Court can take judicial notice of 
the fact that the establishment of a new business within 
100 feet of an old, long established business is 'vithin 
the confines of the trade area served by that old estab-
lished business. A_s stated by this Court in Little Cot-
7 
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lonwood fVater Cornpany vs. Kimball~ 76 Utah 2·t3, 
267, 289 P. 116, " ... a Court is presumed to kuo"~ 
wl1at every man of ordinary intelligence must kno\v 
about such things." 
· Had the defendants in fact filed Affidavits deny-
ing the date of incorporation of the plaintiff and its 
date of cotninencing business at its address in Sugar-
house, in opposition to the Inatters set forth in the 
answers under oath to interrog·atories, it would appear 
that such Affidavits would have been made in bad faith 
and should have been treated as such under the provi-
sions of Rule 58 (g) of the Utah Rules of Civil l~ro­
cedure. 
In Co1nmercial Credit Corporatio~n vs. California 
tllhipbuilding Corporation~ DC Cal. 1947, 71 l~~eu. 
Supp, 936, it was held that 'vhere parties admit that 
there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, 
sununary judgment 1nay be granted in favor of a de-
fendant even on the plaintiff's tnotion for sum1nary 
judgment. In the case of Greenlaw vs. Rodick ( l\Iaine 
1962) 186 Fed. 529, it was held that plaintiff's answers 
to interrogatories (even thought not under oath) could 
be relied upon by the plaintiff itself in opposition to 
a motion for summary judgtnent. 
']]1e whole logic of the situation is simply this, 
that where statements are made under oath by parties 
and a motion is 1nade for sutnmary judgment and each 
party is put specifically on notice that the staten1ents 
so made under oath~ 'vhether by answer to interroga-
8 
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tories, or otherwise, · will be relied upon in support \ 
the n1otio11 for su1n1nary judgment, then it is incuinbeti, .,, 
upon any party intending to dispute or controvert such 
allegations under oath to present evidence or other 
contradictory infor1nation specifically negativing any 
such allegations. 
If defendant's intended to controvert the facts, 
they should have so advised the Court and the plaintiff. 
lrnder the representations n1ade by counsel (R 36) 
the Court had no alternative than to grant surmnary 
judgment for either plaintiff or the defendants. 
In U.S. vs. l(a·nsas Gas and Electric (}ompwny 
( CA lOth Cir.) 287 l~ed 2d 601, considering Federal 
Rule 56 relating to 1notions for summary judgment, 
it 'vas held that the ans,ver of the plaintiff to interroga-
tories of the defendant should be properly considered 
in opposition to a motion of the defendant for sumn1ary 
judgment. In other words, that the answers of a party 
should be considered in its favor, as well as against it, 
in a 1notion for stunmary judg1nent. The court stateu 
that the ans,vers of the defendant to the interrogatories 
of the plaintiff were substantial statements of material 
facts which the court "'as not only entitled, but was 
required to consider. 
It is not the purpose for which an affidavit or 
answer under oath is filed in an action which deter-
Jnine whether or not the same may be used in connection 
'vith a motion for summary judgment. It is the sub-
stance thereof and the fact that, having been made 
9 
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under oath and under a compulsion to set forth the 
facts as they are known accurately to exist, that the 
statement was made a part of the record. Barron and 
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Volume 3, 
Section 1236, states: 
"Affidavits are not required by th-e rule and 
their absence will not prevent summary judg-
ment if the other 1natters shown on the motion 
are sufficient. The affidavit of a party on file in 
the case will be considered regardless of the 
purpose for which it was filed." 
Section 1239 of that same volume states: 
"It frequently happens that both sides will 
agree that there are no fact issues, and will join 
in the request that the case be decided, for one 
side or the other, on the basis of a motion for 
judgment made by one of the parties. In such 
a situation grant of judgment for the technically 
nonmoving party is plainly proper." 
Such being the rule, surely when both parties have 
agreed that there are no issues of fact and join in a 
request that the case be decided,and when both have 
made motions for summary judgment, it is proper for 
the Court to grant such a motion upon the basis of 
the facts before it. 
In Albert vs. McGrath_, 104 Fed. Supp. 891 (DC 
Cal. 1952) in discussing summary judgments, the 
Court stated that "the object of the rule per1nitting 
sumn1ary judgment is to allow summary disposition of 
cases ,vhich, on the face of the co1nplaint and of addi-
lO 
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tional facts appearing from supporting docume ... -
show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact'. 
to be tried; and in determining the matter, resort is~ 
had to extrinsic facts throug·h affidavits, admissions "' 
a.nd the like. 'fhis in1plies that a finding of absence 
of a genuine issue as to any n1aterial fact will be made, 
despite the fact that the pleadings, as they stand, pre-
sent such an issue. (Citing cases) . When the factual 
issue is simple and can be determined by the Court 
without choosing between conflicting views, summary 
judgment is proper." 'l'he factual sitation in the case 
at bar is simple and the parties having agreed that 
there were no genuine issues of material facts, the 
Court was surely justified on the basis of the facts 
before it in entering sumn1ary judgment for the plani-
tiff. 
A review of the files and pleadings of the action 
will amply support the findings of fact made by the 
Court in support of its summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff herein. 
II 
PLAIN'l,IF~F,-RESJ?ONllENT HAD ESTAB-
LISHED PRIORI'l~Y OF RIGHT TO 'filE 
NAME "PIONEER" IN 'fHE SUGARHOUSE 
TRADE AREA. 
There is a division of authority among the st ates in 
this country as to whether or not a company can acquire 
11 
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a property right in a generic name such as "Pioneer," 
so that it may invoke the law in protecting such a 
right. In the case of Budget System Incorporated v. 
Budget Loan and Finance Plan_, 12 Utah 2d. 18; 361 
P.2d 512, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
decidedin accordance with the majority rule, that there 
is such a property right, and that courts of equity, if 
called upon, will protect it. On the basis of these cases, 
it seems clear that the word "Pioneer" in the name is 
such a term as will be protected by law if a competing 
firm uses it in such a way that it may confuse the 
public or injure the firm first using the name in a given 
trade area. 
Among other cases in which relief was granted to 
the first party using a trade name in a certain trade 
area are the following: 
Atlas Assurance Company-Atlas Insurance Com-
pany~ 112 N.W. 232; Iowa Auto Market-Auto Mar-
ket and Exchange~ 197 N.W. 312; Buick Motor Co.-
Buick Used Motors~ 229 N.Y. Supp. 3; N.M._; New-
co1ner Company-Newcomer-'s New Store_, 217 S.W. 
822; Albany Savings Banl{;-Albany City Savings Bank~ 
190 N.Y. Supp. 334, both banks located in the same 
city; International Trust Company-Internatio1~al Loan 
and Trust Company~ 26 N.E. 693, Mass.; B. Forman 
Cornpany-Forma1~ Manufacturing Company~ Inc.~ 
125 N.Y. Supp. 597. Here both companies dealt in 
the retailing of furs and the second company proposed 
to establish its store only a few doors distance from 
12 
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that of the first company. [(ansas City Real Estal 
and Stock Exchange-l(ansas (}ity Real Estate Ex-
cha.nge_, 5 S.W. 29; Lamb [(nit Goods Company-Lamb 
Glove and Mitten Company_, 78 N.W. 1072. ~-,actories 
here were located in different towns, but the business 
was done mainly through agents, and there were many 
instances of confusion; McFall Electric Co.-Mcll'all 
Electric and 'l"elephone C"o._, 110 Ill. App. 182; Plant-
ers) Fertilizer & Phosphate Co.-Planters"' Fertilizer Co._, 
133 S.E. 706; Van Aucken Steam Specialty Co.-Van 
Aucken ( 1ompany_, 57 Ill. All. 240; Empire Trust Com-
pany-Empire Finance_ C"or]Joration) 41 S.W. 2d 847; 
American Radio Store Inc.-American Radio & Tele-
vision Stores Corp.) 17 Del. 127, 150 A. 180, where the 
court observed that the words "radio" and "stores" 
were purely descriptive and so not appropriable, but 
the addition of the word '~America11" was a distin-
guishing mark, in the use of which claimant was en-
titled to be protected. Personal Finance (}ompany of 
Lincoln-Personal Loan Service) 275 N.W. 324, Nebr.; 
Standard Oil (Yo. of Calif.-Standard Oil Co. of New 
Mexico_, 56 F.2d 973, CCA lOth. 'l~he Court observed 
that there could be no doubt that if defendant were 
permitted to engage in the petroleum business, third 
persons would deal with defendant thinking they were 
dealing with plaintiff; Standard Oil Co. of New Y O'rh"-
Standard Oil Co. of Maine_, 45 F. 2d 309, CCA I. 
In the case of Sec1trit~J Title Insurance Agency 
v. ,Yecurity Title Insurance Company_, 15 Utah 2nd 
13 
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93, 387 P. 2d 691, this Court also held that the names 
were sufficiently similar to cause confusion and that 
the first company using the name in the given trade 
area could protect it by injunctive proceedings. 
Under the decided cases the question of which 
corporation was prior in point of time in registering 
the na1ne with the Secretary of State or other public 
officers, does not seem to be controlling. 'l"'he crucial 
matter is which of the fir1ns first used the name in com-
merce in a given trade area. For example, in the lower 
court, in the case of Budget System Incorporated v. 
Budget Loan & Finance Plan_, supra_, the Court found 
that: 
" 'Budget' in defendant's name has caused and 
will continue to cause confusion and deception 
to the public in the Salt Lake City area among 
present and potential customers therein." 
Again the Supreme Court in this case says: 
"By its findings the trial court seems justified 
because of the first two of the stated theories in 
concluding that plaintiff has acquired a right to 
exclusive use of the word "Budget" in the finance 
business in this locality.-'-' (Emphasis added). 
We will concede that the defendants were the first 
to use the term "Pioneer" in their title (although a 
different title than they now use) in Salt Lake County. 
They had an industrial loan operation in Midvale. The 
question to be determined under this section, therefore, 
is whether or not Midvale and Sugarhouse are in the 
sa1ne "locality" or "trade area, as the term is used in 
14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the decided cases. In a Yery recent case, Seegmiller v. 
H,unt~ 15 Utah 2nd 269, 391 P. 2d 298, the Supreme\J· 
Court of Utah stated: · :· .. ( .. 
"'l,he Court has recognized the principle that 
equity will protect a trade name in the area which 
is coextensive with its reputation. The extent of 
this area and its boundaries is a question of fact 
rather than law.'' 
What are the agreed facts in regard to the Sugar-
house area and the l\1idvale area, and what are the 
facts which the Court could know and consider as a 
rna tter of common know ledge? 
As hereinabove stated, the Court is presumed to 
know what every man of ordinary intelligence must 
know. 'fhe Court knows and the answers to interroga-
tories substantiate that Sugarhouse is located within 
the corporate limits of Salt Lake City. It is a shopping 
or trade area on East 21st South in Salt Lake City, 
which is highly commercialized and which is insulated 
from other trade areas by a residential area ( R 15) . 
The Court can know as a matter of common knowledge 
that Sugarhouse is separated from Midvale by approxi-
mately ten miles. Furthermore, there are intervening 
between them a number of shopping or trade areas, 
surrounded by residential areas. There is no cotnmu-
nity of economic interest between Midvale and Sugar .. 
house. In its answers to supplemental interrogatories, 
the plaintiff states that the great majority of its 2160 
accounts which it services from its Sugarhouse office 
15 
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would reside in the area bounded as follows: South 
of 13th South, North of 4800 South and East of 7th 
East (R 19). The individuals residing in this area 
would seldom, if ever, have occasion to conduct business 
in .NI~dvale. It also appears from these interrogatories 
that the plaintiff has limited its direct mail advertising 
campaigns to those residing 'vithin a three mile radius 
of its Sugar house offiee ( R 20) . 'l"'he individuals who 
would be doing business of a financial nature in Sugar-
house are almost entirely distinct from those who would 
be doing a similar type business in Midvale. There 
can be no question but that if the plaintiff atte1npted 
to open a savings and loan branch adjacent to the 
defendants Midvale office under the name of Pioneer 
Savings & Loan Association, the defendants would 
be entitled to injunctive relief as having first used the 
nan1e Pioneer in the Midvale trade area. 
III 
THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF THE 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ARE SO 
SIMILAR AS TO BE CONFUSING AND MIS-
LEADING TO THE PUBLIC. 
In their brief the defendants take the position that 
the nature of the business carried on by the plaintiff 
and the defendants are so dissimilar that ·no confusion 
in the minds of the public can result. The very fact, 
however, that the defendants have to strain so hard 
16 
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on this point indicates the confusion that will result. 
It is true, as the defendants' brief points out, that 
different statutory sections authorize the organization 
of and define the powers of building and loan associa-
tions than those governing industrial loan corporations. 
However, the average citizen does not even have access 
to a set of the Utah statutes, much less is he inclined 
to read them. Therefore, this distinction is a mean-
ingless distinction 'vhich would certainly not have the 
effect of differentiating the activities of the two con1-
panies in the public mind. The same thing can be said 
for the distinction which the defendants attempt to 
draw on the basis of the different amounts of authorized 
loans which may be made by savings and loan corpo-
rations and industrial loan companies. The fact remains, 
however, that the plaintiff and the defendants are both 
engaged in the business of taking deposits from the 
public and making loans to the public, and particularly 
in the field of taking deposits is it probable that the 
public could be mislead to its detriment. Industrial 
loan companies typically pay higher interest rates on 
their deposits than do savings and loan associations, 
which they have to do to try to attract capital because 
of the greater stability of savjngs and loan associations. 
A member of the public might well be mislead, in this 
instance, in making a deposit with the defendant com-
panies at their higher rate of interest, to believe that 
he was getting the security of a savings and loan conl-
pany deposit. 
17 
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It is not necessary under the decided cases that the 
business of the companies involved be identical. 'l"hey 
may merely be so similar in 11ature as to give rise to 
the probability of confusion. 'fhe following language 
is found in the Security Title case, supra: 
"Although appellant is a title insurer and not 
in the business of abstracting and exa1nining 
land titles in this state, nevertheless, the business 
activities of respondents and appellant are so 
closely related that unfair activities can have a 
deleterious effect. 'l,his is so because respondents' 
and appellant's services are connected with land 
titles, and the customer's ultimate need is sup-
plied by the same type of preliminary service 
as to title." 
In thise case, as pointed out above, both the -plain-
tiff and the defendants are engaged in taking deposits 
and making loans. In other words, of meeting the finan-
cial needs of the public, both as to investment and as 
to the obtaining of financing. While a trained legal 
mind may well be able to differentiate between the two 
types of activities, the average person desiring to de-
posit his money on interest, or the average person desir-
ing to make a loan will not so differentiate. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law of the lower court were amply 
supported by the evidence, pleadings and admitted 
facts and that such judgment shoudl be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ZAR E. HAYES 
PUGSLEY,HAYES,RAMPTON 
& WATKISS 
600 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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